Protecting ‘national security’ whistleblowers in the Council of Europe: an evaluation of three approaches on how to balance national security with freedom of expression by Kagiaros, D
                                                                                           1 
 
Protecting ‘National Security’ Whistleblowers in the Council of 
Europe: An evaluation of three approaches on how to balance 
National Security with Freedom of Expression 
 
 
In its recent case law, the ECtHR has extended freedom of expression protection to 
whistleblowers, including those who work for the intelligence and security sector. 
Thus, contracting parties to the ECHR are required to balance any damage to national 
security caused by the disclosure, with the public interest in the information revealed, 
before handing down sanctions to the whistleblower for a breach of official secrecy. 
The paper will identify, and critically evaluate, three possible approaches to balancing 
national security with the whistleblower’s right to freedom of expression and the public 
interest in the disclosure of the information. These approaches are firstly, an absolute 
ban on external disclosures for intelligence officials; secondly, a broad exemption from 
criminal sanctions or other forms of retaliation when the interest in the information 
disclosed outweighs national security concerns; and finally, protection from reprisals 
provided only for specific disclosures or categories of wrongdoing, which are 
exhaustively enumerated in the law. It will examine the compatibility of each approach 
with nascent COE whistleblower protection standards and conclude that the final 
approach, in spite of its deficiencies, can best guarantee the whistleblower’s right to 
free speech while ensuring that security is protected. 
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Council of Europe 
  
                                                                                           2 
 
Introduction  
Institutions often fail us. Public or private institutions can go wrong due to maladministration, 
incompetence or deliberate attempts to abuse power to achieve illegitimate aims. Such 
instances of misconduct are often revealed through whistleblowers – individuals who in the 
course of their work come across information relating to wrongdoing and decide to speak out 
about it.1 Such individuals have begun to enjoy protection from retaliation on an international 
and regional level under freedom of expression provisions in recognition of the fact that in 
certain cases, the public interest (PI) in the disclosure of certain information can be so 
compelling as to outweigh a legally binding duty of confidence.2 Whistleblowers who work 
for the security or intelligence sector however, remain disadvantaged under this burgeoning 
protection scheme. In both the US and the UK for instance, individuals from the intelligence 
world3 who have proceeded to unauthorised disclosures of wrongdoing, have been met with 
severe penalties and prosecutions4 more akin to ‘spies committing treachery’.5 National 
security whistleblowers are in many cases ‘separate and immune’6 from domestic 
whistleblower protection laws7 and are instead usually expected to rely exclusively on 
internal procedures provided by the executive to report instances of wrongdoing they have 
uncovered.8 
Recent developments in whistleblower protection however, call for a re-evaluation of 
the protection provided to the national security whistleblower. In the Council of Europe 
(COE), the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 
‘the Court’) in its recent case law, have been setting standards for the protection of 
whistleblowers under freedom of expression that have included protection for members of the 
military and the security and intelligence community.9 The free speech protection from 
reprisals that is afforded to good faith whistleblowers in the COE is the result of a balancing 
exercise between the public interest in disclosure and the public interest in maintaining 
secrecy. When the former outweighs the latter, restrictions to the whistleblower’s free speech 
rights cannot be justified, if the whistleblower acted in good faith.10  This balancing exercise 
however, when applied in the context of whistleblowing that affects national security, 
presents a series of complications. If contracting parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) are to take this balancing into consideration in order to secure 
compliance with the Convention, their secrecy laws pertaining to the unauthorised public 
disclosure of security related information must be framed in a way that allows them to take 
into account the possible PI in an unauthorised disclosure before handing down any sanctions 
to the intelligence official.  
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It is important to note however, that in spite of these developments on the COE level, 
whistleblower protection legislation is a rarity among European states. In the European Union 
for instance, only four states11 have comprehensive whistleblower protection laws, a further 
16 have only ‘partial provisions and procedures’12, while the remaining states have no form 
of protection for whistleblowers. The situation for intelligence sector employees is worse, as 
the framework for their protection remains entirely inchoate, even among the EU and COE 
member states with more advanced whistleblower protection frameworks. For instance, the 
United Kingdom’s Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 excludes members of the Security and 
Intelligence community,13 while in Sweden, the general rule that any employee in the public 
or private sector can pass on information to the media, is not applicable in relation to official 
secrets and national security information.14 Similarly, the Romanian Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 2004 provides particularly broad protection from retaliation to government 
employees who blow the whistle, however penalties under official secrets legislation in 
relation to security-sensitive disclosures have been passed down to whistleblowers.15 
Furthermore, some states do not clearly differentiate between the disclosure of state secrets 
and acts of espionage.16 For instance, while Swedish legislation makes a clear distinction 
between the two, by requiring the involvement of a foreign power for the commission of 
espionage,17 the UK’s Official Secrets Act 1989 simply penalizes any public disclosure of 
information for members of the security and intelligence community.18 Thus, while 
whistleblower protection for security sector employees is virtually nonexistent, COE member 
states have robust legislation penalizing the disclosure of state secrets.19 This varies in forms, 
especially in relation to how an ‘official secret’ is defined.20 However, national security 
consistently appears as a reason to bar disclosure,21 and coupled with the lack of 
whistleblower protection for security sector employees, creates an almost impenetrable 
fortress of secrecy in security matters.  
          This lack of standards for whistleblower protection in general on the domestic level, 
prompted the COE Committee of Ministers to release a recommendation22 encouraging 
member states to adopt whistleblower protection legislation that allows for a balancing of the 
public interest in non-disclosure, with the public interest in an informed citizenry. Therefore, 
what the paper aims to explore, is how secrecy laws or whistleblower protection instruments 
can incorporate this balancing exercise in order to protect security sector whistleblowers and 
thus to secure the compatibility of their legislation with freedom of speech standards on the 
one hand, while ensuring that national security will not be compromised on the other. The 
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paper identifies three possible avenues for this public interest exercise to be included in the 
law. 
The first approach considers public disclosures, to the media for instance, as 
incompatible with the role of the intelligence official. It thus altogether disposes of the 
balancing exercise between the interest in disclosure of the specific information and national 
security. Consequently, this approach does not require proof of damage to security interests 
in order to justify retaliation against the whistleblower. In order to ensure the compatibility of 
such a law with emerging COE freedom of expression standards, the paper argues that a 
robust system that would permit internal disclosures to official mechanisms for raising 
concern would be required. If these mechanisms were genuinely independent of the line 
management chain and could ensure that individuals approaching them would be protected 
and that their concerns would be effectively addressed, free speech restrictions to public 
whistleblowers could be justified. The paper will argue however, that such internal 
mechanisms have their inherent limitations and the COE standards allow for public 
disclosures even when such mechanisms exist in specific circumstances that will be examined 
in detail. Thus, an absolute ban on external reporting would be difficult to reconcile with 
ECHR freedom of expression standards. 
The second approach would be for the law to include a rebuttable presumption that 
public disclosures from intelligence officials are damaging to national security. If the 
whistleblower was nonetheless able to prove that, as a means of last resort, the interest in 
publicly disclosing the information outweighed security concerns, protection would be 
provided. While this approach would require an ad hoc assessment of whether any freedom 
of expression restrictions that the whistleblower experienced were justified based on the 
damage caused by the disclosure, the lack of a definition as to what would constitute 
wrongdoing could result in ‘opening the floodgates’ and in allowing overzealous intelligence 
sector employees to make assessments on particularly sensitive national security issues, thus 
‘usurping’ the role of their superiors. If the intelligence official’s duty of confidentiality was 
conditional in this sense, the intelligence services would not be able to function effectively, 
and whistleblowers would face the risk that their own interpretation of the public interest, a 
notoriously nebulous concept, would not be confirmed by the courts.  
The final approach includes specific definitions or categories of wrongdoing that 
would allow the whistleblower to proceed to public disclosures as a means of last resort, 
either in the form of specific exemptions to secrecy or as categories of protected disclosures 
in a whistleblower protection instrument. This approach, where the balancing exercise 
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between national security and the interest in disclosure is enshrined in law, allows 
whistleblowers a greater degree of certainty that their disclosures will be protected and 
ensures that they will not proceed to arbitrary PI assessments. However, this has the 
drawback that whistleblower protection becomes conditional on the generosity of lawmakers 
in their interpretation of the public interest in the law. Therefore, if lawmakers follow a 
particularly narrow approach, there is a risk that whistleblowers’ free speech rights will not 
be upheld. Furthermore, the lack of consensus on the international level as to which specific 
disclosures would be deemed important enough to outweigh national security concerns and 
allow for public disclosures, would make the implementation of such a system questionable 
as to its feasibility in the security sector. However, the paper will conclude that this approach 
offers the most reasonable solution to the issue at hand, and along with strengthened regional 
standards on whistleblower protection and vigilance on behalf of the judiciary, would provide 
concrete protection to whistleblowers while ensuring that security concerns are adequately 
addressed. 
Before proceeding with the examination of each of these approaches and their impact 
on whistleblowers’ free speech rights, it is necessary to examine how the freedom of 
expression of whistleblowers has been protected on the COE level, followed by a short 
analysis of how the whistleblower becomes, in essence, an assessor of the PI when deciding 
to proceed to a public disclosure. The paper will then proceed to examine the aforementioned 
approaches before providing some thoughts on the status of the intelligence official 
whistleblower. 
 
1) Protection for Whistleblowers in the COE 
Free speech in contracting parties to the Convention is largely informed by Article 10 of the 
ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR, which domestic courts are expected to take into 
account when deciding on cases that involve human rights.23  
When faced with the challenge of assessing whether a restriction to a right is in line 
with Convention standards, 24 the Court will examine whether the measure that interferes with 
the right is prescribed by law and whether it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.25 This 
requires the state to prove that ‘action taken is in response to a pressing social need, and that 
the interference with the rights protected is no greater than is necessary to address that 
pressing social need’.26  
Articles of the Convention that provide for restrictions to rights are to be narrowly 
construed, however, states enjoy ‘a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation in the 
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matter of the imposition of restrictions’.27 The margin of appreciation doctrine, which appears 
prominently in national security related cases, maintains that state parties are ‘entitled to 
certain latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts between individual rights and national 
interests’.28 This translates in practice to a ‘judicial self-restraint’29 – at times significant – on 
the part of the ECtHR.  
In relation to state secrecy, the ECtHR has recognised in its case law that ‘a consensus 
appears to exist among the member States of the Council of Europe on the need for 
appropriate criminal sanctions to prevent the disclosure of certain confidential items of 
information’.30 It is also common practice for intelligence officials to sign agreements that 
they will never reveal or publish any information relating to their work in the Services, 
without seeking prior authorisation.31 However, the COE Parliamentary Assembly, in 
Resolution 1551 (2007), called on the Court ‘to find an appropriate balance between the state 
interest in preserving official secrecy on the one hand, and freedom of expression […] and 
society’s interest in exposing abuses of power on the other hand’.32 In a similar vein, 
Resolution 1507 (2006) had called for member States to ‘ensure that the laws governing state 
secrecy protect the whistleblowers, that is persons who disclose illegal activities of state 
organs from possible disciplinary or criminal sanctions’.33 The Assembly has also 
consistently argued that ‘[c]rimes such as murder, enforced disappearances, torture or 
abduction committed by state agents do not deserve to be protected as “state secrets”’.34 It 
was Resolution 1729 (2010) on the protection of whistleblowers however, that went further to 
encourage member states to adopt whistleblower protection legislation for individuals who in 
good faith ‘sound an alarm in order to stop wrongdoings that place fellow human beings at 
risk’.35 The Resolution included members of the security services and armed forces in its 
ambit of protection.36 In defining which disclosures should enjoy protection the Resolution 
provided that: 
 
The definition of protected disclosures shall include all bona fide warnings against various 
types of unlawful acts, including all serious human rights violations which affect or 
threaten the life, health, liberty and any other legitimate interests of individuals as subjects 
of public administration or taxpayers.37 
 
  It urged state parties to adopt whistleblower legislation that would ‘protect anyone 
who, in good faith, makes use of existing internal whistle-blowing channels from any form of 
retaliation’.38 Thus it is safe to deduce that internal mechanisms are viewed as the initial 
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avenue for whistleblowers to raise concern.  The resolution however, went further to stress 
that:  
 
         [W]here internal channels either do not exist, have not functioned properly or could 
reasonably be expected not to function properly given the nature of the problem raised by 
the whistle-blower, external whistle-blowing, including through the media, should 
likewise be protected.39 
 
Therefore, the mere fact that internal whistleblowing mechanisms exist does not suffice to 
argue that an absolute prohibition on external reporting can be justified. This view was 
reinforced through the Committee of Ministers recommendation to COE member states, 
which noted that ‘the individual circumstances of each case will determine the most 
appropriate channel’40 for raising concern. 
 
The view that alerting the media should be a viable avenue even for national security 
whistleblowers was further solidified in the COE’s Parliamentary Resolution 1838 (2011), 
which provided that: 
 
The media play a vital role in the functioning of democratic institutions, in particular by 
investigating and publicly denouncing unlawful acts committed by state agents, including 
members of the secret services. They rely heavily on the co-operation of “whistle-
blowers” within the services of the state. The Assembly reiterates its calls for adequate 
protection…for whistleblowers.41 
 
Similarly, Resolution 1877 (2012) provided that in relation to secrecy laws, ‘member 
States must not curtail the right of the public to be informed by restricting the right of 
individuals to disclose information of public concern, for example by applying…national 
security and anti-terrorist laws in an overly broad and non-proportional manner’.42 Finally, 
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1954 (2013), provided that ‘[a] person who discloses 
wrongdoings in the public interest (whistle-blower) should be protected from any type of 
retaliation, provided he or she acted in good faith and followed applicable procedures’.43 
Applicable procedures would therefore refer to the use internal mechanisms when these are 
available and public disclosures only in cases where these mechanisms fail. 
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Turning to the Court, the primacy of free speech in a democratic society is well 
established in the ECtHR case law.44 For the ECtHR, the function of the press  as a “public 
watchdog” is central to  a democracy,45 and ‘the national margin of appreciation is limited 
when the author of the expression in question is a journalist’.46 Press freedom has indirectly 
protected  anonymous whistleblowers, as the Court has consistently held that compelling a 
journalist to reveal the source of an information leak constitutes a free speech violation.47 
However, in  more recent cases, Article 10 protection has not been limited to protecting the 
dissemination of leaked information through the press, but was extended to include the source 
of the leak, the good faith whistleblower.  
The landmark case of Guja v. Moldova48, was the ‘first to deal explicitly with the 
practice of whistleblowing’.49 In Guja, the ECtHR allowed for Article 10 protection for 
whistleblowers by asserting that ‘the interest which the public may have in particular 
information can sometimes be so strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of 
confidence’.50 In the case of Bucur and Toma v Romania,51 the ECtHR examined PI 
disclosures by intelligence officials. The Court seemed to differentiate between leaks of state 
secrets with no discernible PI52 (where states retain a wide margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether their release could damage national security)53 and whistleblowing in the 
public interest. The Court held that retaliation against a good faith whistleblower who 
publicly disclosed instances of illegal surveillance by the Romanian services, after 
unsuccessfully attempting to address the issue using internal means, was in fact a violation of 
Article 10. The national security arguments against disclosure in Bucur, led the Court to 
argue that protecting national security cannot come at the price of destroying democracy54 
and it proceeded to criticise the domestic courts for not taking into account the applicant’s 
arguments relating to the public interest of the information disclosed.55 
Before proceeding to examine how these developments could affect secrecy legislation 
in the Contracting Parties to the ECHR however, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the 
process under which the whistleblower, by deciding that certain information is in fact 
deserving of exposure, becomes in fact an assessor of the PI. By conducting a PI test to 
ascertain whether the interest in releasing the information at hand outweighs competing 
security considerations, national security whistleblowers become engaged in a complex 
balancing exercise, the outcome of which is not necessarily objective. 
 
2) The whistleblower as an assessor of the Public Interest 
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The paper submits that an act of an unauthorised public disclosure can be further analysed 
into a two - step process. Initially, the whistleblower makes an evaluation that certain 
information he or she has come across relates to wrongdoing.56 Subsequently, the 
whistleblower decides, after finding that an internal report would be ineffectual, that it would 
be beneficial to make this instance of misconduct public. Both these steps however, contain 
an assessment that relates to the public interest.  
In the first step, according to the whistleblower’s understanding, there is a specific 
activity of an organisation that contravenes the PI. In the national security context, such a 
balancing exercise, when conducted by the whistleblower, is fraught with dangers. Although 
in some cases it is self-evident that the information the whistleblower comes across relates to 
wrongdoing – for instance where there is clear evidence of corruption or state complicity in 
gross human rights violations – this is not always the case. In the context of national security 
especially, the work of the intelligence community or the war against terrorism, it may not be 
simple for the potential whistleblower to discern between legitimate conduct of a public 
authority, and wrongdoing.57 The services, by their nature, infringe on human rights, namely 
the right to privacy protected under Article 8 ECHR, when they monitor communications for 
instance in order to collect intelligence.58 For a whistleblower to ascertain whether specific 
instances of such monitoring constitute misconduct, he or she must perform a balancing 
exercise to assess whether in these ‘suspicious’ cases the intelligence agency is acting within 
the remit of the law or not. Thus, a PI balancing exercise between security and the privacy of 
the monitored individual must take place before the whistleblower decides to proceed with a 
disclosure.  
The second step involves a decision on whether the perceived wrongdoing is so 
severe as to warrant a public disclosure. The whistleblower therefore decides to disclose the 
information in an act that in fact ‘overrides the judgment of the executive authority’.59 This 
means that the whistleblower asserts, contrary to the judgment of his or her superiors, that the 
PI will be best served by full disclosure of the information at hand and that this interest 
outweighs conflicting interests in security.60 Although the decision to ‘go public’ could in 
many cases be motivated by the fact that the whistleblower was unable to address the issue 
using less extreme measures, an assessment of the PI is required, as the whistleblower would 
be reluctant to breach his or her duty of confidentiality to reveal information that is trivial and 
of little importance to the public discourse. As Morse notes, ‘not all violations of law are 
equally important to make public’.61 Therefore the balancing exercise between the interest in 
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security and the interest in the disclosure is in such circumstances entrusted to the individual 
whistleblower. 
Due to the PI being a particularly nebulous concept which lacks a concrete and 
universally accepted definition that can be applied in every case,62 it is an arduous task for the 
whistleblower to assess whether this evaluation and judgment that leads to a disclosure is 
indeed in the PI.63 This could result in problems when granting free speech protection, as any 
restrictions to the whistleblower’s free speech that are due to damage caused to national 
security by the disclosure, could be justified under Article 10 (2). Therefore, it is vital for 
secrecy laws or whistleblower protection instruments pertaining to national security 
whistleblowers, to take this balancing exercise into account and to examine ways to protect 
the whistleblower while ensuring that overzealous employees are not encouraged to proceed 
to complicated PI and national security assessments that result in harmful disclosures. 
The question that the paper aims to answer therefore, in relation to the intelligence 
community whistleblower, is how official secrecy legislation can be framed in light of the 
recent developments in whistleblower protection mentioned above, in order to ensure firstly, 
that the whistleblower’s assessment on the PI is less of an instinctual process, and secondly, 
that security is not harmed to a disproportionate extent when weighed against the public 
interest in disclosure.  
After these clarifications the paper will proceed to examine the first possible avenue 
for secrecy legislation to be framed. 
 
3) The first approach: A blanket ban on disclosures 
The first method to frame secrecy legislation or confidentiality agreements of the intelligence 
official seeks to exclude discussion of a possible PI in public disclosures, by using criminal 
law or other retaliatory measures to prosecute those who proceed to any unauthorized 
disclosures of information. This approach is premised on the idea that it is the act of publicly 
disclosing security related information itself that is contrary to the PI, regardless of whether 
or not the specific disclosure actually endangered national security.64 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR has held that information relating to security and intelligence can legitimately be 
withheld from the public.65 This is the system currently favoured by the Official Secrets Act 
1989 (OSA 1989) in the UK, for instance which does not allow for public disclosure of 
information by members of the Intelligence and Security Community, even if it relates to 
wrongdoing.66 The OSA 1989 does not include a damage test for intelligence officials, which 
means that the prosecution is not required to prove that there was some damage caused to 
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national security or other state interests in order to hand down penalties against the 
whistleblower under criminal law.67 Furthermore the act does not include a PI defence, which 
would allow the whistleblower to argue that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the 
public interest in security. Thus, the irrebuttable presumption that disclosures emanating from 
the Services are damaging68 results in prohibiting the judiciary from making an ad hoc 
assessment of the national security considerations that could be endangered by a specific 
disclosure, in order to assess the legitimacy of the free speech restriction. 
For those supporting this line of argument, the role of the intelligence official should 
be limited to providing support to the government of the day and not to assume the role of an 
‘impartial umpire’ in political disputes.69 The work of civil servants in general requires them 
to support and not hinder the government of the day and thus they assume a particularly 
strong duty of loyalty.70 Furthermore, since for intelligence officials ‘their official job duty is 
protecting the country’s national security interests’,71 more stringent free speech restrictions 
are permissible. This approach ensures that the whistleblower will not proceed to PI 
assessments, particularly in issues that touch upon the security of the state. An absolute 
restriction on disclosures relies on the idea that the interests of maintaining public confidence 
in these institutions, the fact that such disclosures carry with them a particularly strong 
credibility, and the heightened duty of secrecy of intelligence officials, all outweigh any 
potential benefit from a public disclosure.72 Thus the value of the information disclosed to the 
PI is not part of the proportionality equation, and any information, however trivial, when 
disclosed can justify criminal sanctions or other forms of retaliation if the authorities decide 
to prosecute. Thus the ‘balancing exercise’ of the interest in the information and national 
security is altogether discarded as ‘the protection of secrets is synonymous with the public 
interest’.73 
This approach seems to be irreconcilable prima facie with the established COE 
whistleblower and free speech standards examined above. However, the fact that public 
whistleblowing to the media is protected only when more discreet means of remedying the 
situation are not available to the whistleblower,74 could provide contracting parties with the 
necessary justification to ban external disclosures. If a state chooses to follow such an 
approach in order to secure the compatibility of the law with free speech, it would have to 
counterbalance the absolute ban on external disclosures by establishing a robust system of 
independent and effective internal mechanisms, where whistleblowers could report their 
concerns and be protected from reprisals while also be assured that the issues they have 
raised will be addressed appropriately.75 
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The exclusive reliance on internal mechanisms or official channels of reporting 
however can be said to have significant drawbacks. Sagar argues that internal whistleblowing 
carries the danger that the wrongdoing may remain unaddressed. As he stresses, ‘senior 
officials may ignore or suppress a whistleblower’s complaint in order to hide their complicity 
or to avoid a scandal’,76 an internal report could leave the whistleblower without ‘external 
support in the event that her colleagues and managers retaliate against her’,77 and finally, 
using official channels without external pressure ‘could provide wrongdoers with the 
opportunity to destroy incriminating evidence’.78 Internal reporting ‘may also result in 
superficial fixes without deep reform’,79 fixes meant to placate the whistleblower but lacking 
in bringing about genuine results to rectify the misconduct. Research into whistleblowing has 
also consistently shown that external whistleblowing has been more successful in eliciting 
change.80 
Relying on the ECtHR case law,81 one could argue that the existence of effective 
internal mechanisms that be approached by whistleblowers without fear of retaliation would 
negate the need for a whistleblower to approach the media. However, in recognition of the 
inherent limitations of official reporting channels, the Court has found the fact that such 
mechanisms are in place does not suffice to justify an absolute ban on internal disclosures. If 
the nature of the information at hand made it unlikely for internal mechanisms to respond 
appropriately, if the internal mechanisms have a history of not addressing instances of such 
internal whistleblowing, or if they refuse to examine the whistleblower’s allegations, external 
disclosures are permitted under the ECtHR whistleblowing protection regime.82 In Heinisch 
and Bucur for instance, the whistleblowers had approached their superiors to report the illegal 
activity they had uncovered, but no concrete action was taken to address the issue. When they 
subsequently proceeded to a public disclosure they were provided with free speech 
protection.83 Therefore, even if such mechanisms exist, they do not suffice to bar84 the 
whistleblower from proceeding to a public disclosure and courts from proceeding the ad hoc 
test of whether they functioned properly in that particular instance and whether the disclosure 
was in the PI. The first approach therefore, does not provide an adequate solution to the 
problem of balancing the interests of security and disclosures. 
 
4) Second approach: The introduction of a public interest test or defence where 
wrongdoing is not defined in the legislation 
As the paper has argued, the lack of a PI defence in a contracting party’s secrecy legislation, 
would make such legislation suspect as to its compatibility with free speech. This part seeks 
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to discuss how the inclusion of a PI exception to secrecy would affect national security 
whistleblowers.  
Supporters of such an approach argue that official secrecy laws should make for an 
exception for disclosures emanating from a breach of secrecy that are in the PI.85 This would 
allow the intelligence official whistleblower that is facing criminal proceedings for an 
unauthorized disclosure for instance, to employ a PI defence, and to argue that the interest in 
the disclosure outweighs the interest in keeping the information secret. Such a defence, which 
would exonerate national security whistleblowers where they could prove their disclosures 
were in the PI, would also ensure that the state was in line with freedom of expression 
standards on whistleblower protection. An example of this approach can be found in Canada, 
where the Security and Information Act 198586 provides that ‘no person is guilty of an 
offence … if the person establishes that he or she acted in the public interest’.87 The Act does 
not contain a definition of wrongdoing but allows judges to make assessments on whether to 
grant protection based on the whistleblower’s conduct and good faith, the gravity of the 
reported offence, the PI in the disclosure and the possible harm it caused.88 This approach has 
the added benefit that it allows for a future expansion of the understanding of the types of 
conduct that constitute wrongdoing, as courts can take into account novel developments 
without being restricted to a stringent definition of wrongdoing in the law. Similarly in 
Slovenia, while there is no specialised whistleblower protection instrument, public and 
private employees are protected for reporting ‘all forms of illegal or unethical behaviour’.89 
 Such a system would require courts to balance the whistleblower’s free speech rights 
and the public interest in the information disclosed on the one hand, with the potential harm 
the disclosure may cause to national security on the other, by applying the test of 
proportionality.  Since proportionality ‘seeks to police the justification of state interference 
with human rights’,90 it would thus require courts to consider whether any retaliation against 
a security whistleblower could be defended based on the damage caused to national security 
by focusing on the content of the disclosure. As the ECtHR has stressed, ‘the Court must look 
at the “interference” complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether 
the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient’.91  
 In order to gain a better understanding of how such a PI defence would work in 
practice for the national security whistleblower, it is worthwhile to examine the case law of 
the ECtHR with regards to whistleblower protection and disclosures in the public interest in 
general. The Court has provided a useful illustration of how the balancing of the interest in 
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the disclosure and competing concerns that favour non - disclosure can be exercised, when 
assessing whether there has been a freedom of expression violation.  
In Guja, the ECtHR held that the PI involved in the information disclosed is a 
determining factor in assessing the proportionality of an interference with a whistleblower’s 
free speech rights.92 The Court took a broad approach in its interpretation of the PI in this 
instance, by arguing that ‘in a democratic system the acts or omissions of government must 
be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of 
the media and public opinion’.93 In assessing whether freedom of expression protection 
would be extended to the applicant in this particular case, which involved a public disclosure 
of information that showed evidence of political interference in the administration of justice 
from the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office, the ECtHR proceeded with the usual 
proportionality test. In order to make the calculation on whether the disclosure had an 
important benefit to the public at large, the Court looked into the background of the 
disclosure and the overall political context under which it was made94 before concluding that 
‘[t]here is no doubt that these are very important matters in a democratic society which the 
public has a legitimate interest in being informed about and which fall within the scope of 
political debate.’95 In the view of the Court these concerns overrode the interests in 
maintaining public confidence in the Prosecutor General’s Office.96 
In Bucur and Thoma v Romania, a case concerning the disclosure of information by a 
member of the Romanian security services to a newspaper, the ECHR held that ‘the general 
interest in the disclosure of information revealing illegal activities … was so important in a 
democratic society that it prevailed over the interest in maintaining public confidence in that 
institution’.97 In Voskuil v. Netherlands the court stressed that ‘in a democratic state governed 
by the rule of law the use of improper methods by a public authority is precisely the kind of 
issue about which the public has the right to be informed’,98 while in Heinisch it argued for 
an even broader understanding of the PI by stating that ‘there is little scope under Article 10 § 
2 of the Convention for restrictions on debate on questions of public interest’.99 Similarly, in 
Dupuis, the ECtHR took into account the fact that, in France, the revelation of extensive 
wiretapping of political figures in the media, revealed in a book published by two journalists, 
had already ‘aroused a considerable degree of emotion and concern among public opinion’100. 
Thus, the interest already expressed in France over the revelations was a factor to be 
considered by the ECtHR in its balancing of the interest in disclosure with competing 
interests. 
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It is important to note that proof of the Court’s case-by-case approach is found in the 
fact that the circumstances of every contracting party are taken into account during the 
proportionality test when assessing the public interest in the disclosure. This is prevalent in 
issues concerning national security. As Cameron observes, security in the COE is ‘both 
dynamic and relative: what “vulnerability” is will vary from state to state and from time to 
time’.101 In Bucur for instance, the Court stressed that illegal surveillance by the security 
services was undeniably a matter of public interest,102 especially in a state that had 
experienced extensive surveillance under the previous communist regime. Thus, Romania’s 
historical past was viewed as a contributing factor to accept that there was a pressing PI need 
in the disclosure, a PI that was viewed as compelling enough to override the intelligence 
official’s duty of secrecy.   
This type of assessment, on a case-by-case basis, seems to be the optimum way for 
domestic courts to establish the proportionality of an interference with free speech, in cases 
where a national security whistleblower has experienced retaliation. However, when 
examined from the viewpoint of domestic legislation regarding national security, 
whistleblowing and official secrecy, a ‘general’ PI exception to the duty of confidentiality, 
which does not define in a more broad or narrow manner what disclosures would be in the 
public interest and would outweigh security considerations, could result in jeopardising 
national security and the safety of the whistleblower. Without interpretation or guidelines of 
what the PI is, such legislation would not provide any assurances to the potential 
whistleblower that their disclosures will be protected. In political terms, the PI is a highly 
divisive standard. What recent national security related disclosures have confirmed is that 
“people disagree fundamentally over what the public interest is”,103 as evidenced by the fact 
that whistleblowers are, in many cases, simultaneously labelled as heroes or traitors.104 Thus, 
when the whistleblower becomes an assessor of the PI, there is no guarantee that the courts 
will confirm his or her interpretation of the concept.105 
Such disputes, when transferred to the context of a disclosure emanating from the 
intelligence community, can undermine national security. If the whistleblower’s disclosures 
are the result of an instinctual response that perceived wrongdoing should be reported in the 
PI, there is no certainty that irreparable damage will not be caused. It would in fact be 
impossible for the intelligence community to function effectively under such an environment, 
where PI decisions on disclosure are made at every level by any and every employee with 
access to information.  
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Furthermore, even in cases where one could argue that whistleblowers were prudent 
in their interpretation of the PI, it is questionable whether this would be accepted by the 
judiciary. Domestic courts have, to a great degree, shown reluctance to question the executive 
on matters of national security. As Popelier and Van De Heyning note, constitutional and 
supreme courts in Europe, tend to ‘readily accept public safety and security concerns 
proposed by public authorities as legitimate objectives with a considerable weight, without 
scrutinizing the danger … threats actually pose’.106 Thus, a great degree of deference is given 
to decision-makers or the executive in assessing which information should remain secret.  
As many proponents of whistleblowing propose, a way to overcome these potential 
problems is to set the threshold for protection based on whether the whistleblower acted 
under the ‘reasonable belief’ that he or she was uncovering wrongdoing that was in the PI.107 
Protection, it is argued, should also cover disclosures made ‘in honest error’108 when the 
information on wrongdoing that is publicly revealed is inaccurate but the whistleblower acted 
in good faith with the disclosure. This has the benefit of disengaging protection from whether 
the information was in fact in the PI. Yet, when applied to national security whistleblowers, it 
could be said to create more problems than it solves. Firstly, setting the bar at reasonable 
belief that wrongdoing was committed would require the whistleblower to proceed to a more 
thorough examination of the wrongdoing he / she is alleging was committed. This in many 
cases would not be possible to do or could potentially be harmful to the whistleblower and 
could thus further dissuade concerned individuals from proceeding to the disclosure. As 
Lewis proposes, requiring reasonable suspicion, as opposed to reasonable belief, would be a 
better approach as ‘the great advantage of this would be that it would highlight the fact that it 
is the recipient's job to investigate concerns and not that of the potential whistleblower’.109 
However, it is questionable that in the context of national security whistleblowers this 
approach would be realistic. Keeping in mind the heightened demands for secrecy the 
services function under,110 extending free speech protection to disclosures where the concerns 
for national security would outweigh the interest in disclosure would be difficult to reconcile 
with Article 10(2) ECHR. These are the dangers inherent in legislation that would not 
enumerate specific areas of concern, which would guide the whistleblower during his or her 
PI assessment. 
  Thus, providing protection for PI disclosures without defining the PI in the law, 
ensures that the law will allow for a balancing of national security and competing interests on 
a case by case basis and thus will not collide with free speech standards. At the same time 
however, such an approach has the potential to prove more damaging for both the 
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whistleblowers, who will have to navigate the nebulous concept that is PI without guidance, 
and also to national security as the duty of secrecy will become conditional on the PI 
assessments of any employee that handles confidential information. 
This leads us to the examination of the third approach to whistleblower protection / 
official secrecy laws.  
 
5) Third approach: A list of specific PI disclosures contained in the whistleblower 
protection instrument. 
Providing whistleblower protection for only specific types of disclosures enumerated in the 
whistleblower protection instrument or in official secrecy legislation has the benefit of giving 
the whistleblower greater certainty that his/her disclosure will be perceived to be in the PI, a 
PI that will override competing security concerns. In this approach, the balancing between 
national security and the public’s right to know is included in the legal instrument and the 
function of the judiciary is limited to examining whether a specific disclosure falls under one 
or more pre-determined categories. 
The inclusion of a prescribed list of disclosures, especially in relation to national 
security, raises the obvious and important question of which types of wrongdoing should 
qualify for protection. It is first advisable to examine whether there is an international 
consensus on how whistleblowing and secrecy laws deal with definitions on wrongdoing and 
the public interest in disclosures. Second, one must assess whether there are developing 
international standards on when national security related disclosures would be in the PI. 
Finally, it should be asked whether nascent ECHR and COE standards on whistleblowing 
could provide contracting parties with the necessary guidelines to draft their secrecy 
legislation. 
According to Banisar, there are more than 30 countries around the world that have 
adopted some form of whistleblower protection,111 and most ‘create comprehensive 
definitions of what constitutes wrongdoing’.112 Others limit it to one area, usually crimes 
related to corruption, while others provide protection for the disclosure of ‘a wide variety of 
issues including violations of laws, good practises, and ethics’.113 Furthermore, due to the fact 
that ‘the definition of “public interest” varies across different jurisdictions’,114 there are no 
established international standards or a consensus as to what qualifies as a public interest 
disclosure.115 
States possess a degree of flexibility in deciding which areas are most important to 
protect. Circumstances that are specific to certain states seem to play an important part in 
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deciding which areas of wrongdoing will be included in a whistleblower protection 
instrument. As Banisar116 observes, the South African Act ‘includes unfair discrimination’117 
as a category where PI disclosures apply, while the Japanese equivalent ‘specifically names 
food and health laws, clean air and waste disposal, and personal information laws’.118 The US 
approach seems particularly all encompassing119 as the federal Whistleblower Protection Act 
of 1989 protects government employees from sanctions for reporting violation of ‘law, rule 
and regulation’ or ‘gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety’.120 Furthermore, in the US there are 
whistleblower protection schemes found in laws relating to a more specific context. As 
Dworkin explains, ‘an individual who reports illegal water pollution, for instance, is 
protected from retaliation by the Safe Water Drinking Act’.121 As Banisar observes, there is 
agreement however in that states ‘typically require that the action is not trivial in nature and 
has not previously been disclosed or addressed’.122 
How could such categories of protected disclosures however, be framed in the context 
of national security? In the search for international standards on the reasons that would allow 
for public disclosures of wrongdoing in national security cases, Transparency International 
has made a significant contribution to the discussion in its 2013 International Principles for 
Whistleblower Legislation by arguing that: 
 
External disclosure (i.e. to the media, civil society organisations) would be justified in 
demonstrable cases of urgent or grave threats to public health, safety or the environment; 
if an internal disclosure could lead to personal harm or the destruction of evidence; and if 
the disclosure was not intended or likely to significantly harm national security or 
individuals.123 
 
In a similar vein, the Tshwane Principles on National Security and Access to 
Information (2013) attempted to deal with the issue of national security whistleblowers and 
the balancing between national security concerns and their free speech rights. The Principles 
were endorsed by the UN and OSCE Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression and formed the 
basis for the COE’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1954 (2013) which will be examined 
below. 
The principles provide a more specific list as to which types of wrongdoing could 
trigger public disclosures when left unaddressed by internal mechanisms and would allow for 
protection based on the whistleblower’s freedom of speech. The list includes violations of 
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International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, such as the prevention of torture, 
violations of the right to life, decisions to use military force or acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, mass surveillance, mismanagement or waste of funds, constitutional and 
statutory violations, abuses of power and issues relating to public health, public safety or the 
environment.124 
Adapting these principles to the COE level, the Parliamentary Assembly in its 2013 
Resolution on National Security and Access to Information stated that an overriding PI can 
typically be found where the publication of the information in question would make ‘an 
important contribution to an ongoing public debate, promote public participation in political 
debate, expose serious wrongdoings, including human rights violations, other criminal 
offences, abuse of public office and deliberate concealment of serious wrongdoing, … benefit 
public health or safety’.125 The Resolution added that ‘information about serious violations of 
human rights or humanitarian law should not be withheld on national security grounds in any 
circumstances’.126 
  The obvious focus of these provisions is the violation of human rights. The reporting 
of gross human rights violations would in all cases seem to trump national security concerns 
and allow for the national security whistleblower to be protected from retaliation. The 
Tshwane principles in particular, are drawn in a way that validates recent high-profile 
security-related whistleblowing cases,127 however, they could be viewed as overly ambitious, 
as one would expect from a document aiming to provide broad international guidelines on 
whistleblower protection. A strikingly bold step for instance, is the inclusion of decisions on 
the use of military force as a protected category, where there would be a ‘high 
presumption’128 in favour of disclosure. This, according to the Tshwane principles, would 
include protection for disclosure of ‘information relevant to a decision to commit combat 
troops or take other military action, including […] its general size and scope’.129 Thus 
according to the Principles, reporting general information on size and scope would suffice, 
and a disclosure need not contain ‘all of the details of the operational aspects of the military 
action’130 to satisfy the PI in accessing the information. Without doubt, disclosing 
information during the decision-making process leading up to combat would be valuable to 
the PI if there were deliberate attempts from the executive and the intelligence services to 
mislead the legislature and the public131 on the necessity of combat or its rationale. A more 
realistic approach however, would argue that it would be destructive to make combat related 
decisions under the glaring eye of publicity and to allow anyone with access to the specific 
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information to make assessments on which of the operational details could be reported in the 
PI.     
This example of information on the use of military force as a protected category of 
disclosure, illustrates the fact that the existence of a prescribed list of disclosures does not 
relieve the whistleblower from the responsibility of proceeding to complicated PI 
assessments, much like in the second approach we described. Is it feasible to expect every 
intelligence official to be able to discern which operational aspects of an upcoming or 
ongoing combat are worth reporting or whether specific ‘suspicious’ conduct constitutes ‘a 
constitutional or statutory violation’132 which the Tshwane Principles regard as a legitimate 
reason for public disclosures? Although this is true of every whistleblower, in security related 
cases the adverse results of an incorrect assessment are arguably more profound. 
Consequently, a list of protected disclosures as broad as the Tshwane Principles or the ones 
cited in Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1954, can be further criticised for being 
ambiguous and vague in nature. This is compounded by the fact that, for security 
whistleblowers it is ‘impossible […] to obtain independent legal or other advice before 
making a disclosure’.133 However, highly specific and unambiguous categories of 
wrongdoing would have the drawback of being too limited and providing protection that is 
too narrow and is not adaptable to newer developments. 
Thus it is questionable whether, in the realm of the intelligence community, where 
decisions are made on sometimes fragmented intelligence in a highly compartmentalised 
environment, this approach in essence manages to overcome the problems of the 
whistleblower making sensitive PI assessments cited in the second approach we described. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that since ‘hard’ data, purely factual information, are not 
always sufficient to make security related decisions, intelligence agencies also have to rely on 
speculative intelligence in order to determine which people ‘are probably or possibly, 
threatening national security’.134 This is a highly subjective exercise and a degree of 
deference to agency decisions is required, because when it comes to striking these balances, 
the optimum way to deal with a potential threat ‘is not always straightforward, and 
reasonable people can differ on how to do it’.135 Thus, this final method to frame secrecy 
laws does not entirely resolve the dangers that can arise from well-meaning, yet overzealous, 
national security whistleblowers. 
        Furthermore, the fact that the principles mentioned above are derived from non-binding 
instruments means that they can only serve as an indication or suggestion for legislators. 
Therefore, when allowing the types of wrongdoing that warrant public disclosure as a means 
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of last resort to be enumerated in the law, whistleblower protection in national security cases 
becomes conditional on how generous lawmakers will be in their interpretation of the PI in 
the whistleblower protection instrument or the secrecy law. This problem is not limited to 
national security whistleblowers. For instance, and in stark opposition to the broad protection 
provided to federal whistleblowers in the US mentioned above, in France, the French Labour 
Law code provides protection only for disclosures relating to allegations of corruption.136 
Although corruption is a particularly broad term, such legislation would still preclude a 
significant number of whistleblowers whose disclosures are arguably in the PI from seeking 
protection from retaliation. Although the extent to which legislators will agree that certain 
national security disclosures warrant specific protection can be indicated by their free speech 
obligations, they would still be permitted great latitude when translating free speech 
standards for national security whistleblowers into the domestic context.  
In spite of these drawbacks however, this seems to be the most reasonable approach for 
national legislators. To ensure the compatibility of domestic laws with Article 10 without 
weakening the secrecy that is necessary for the intelligence community to function, there 
would need to be a strict prohibition on disclosures, with exemptions where the PI would 
override secrecy requirements, in line with COE and ECtHR free speech standards and COE 
guidelines; combined with the strengthening of the independence of intelligence oversight 
bodies and official reporting mechanisms; as well as adequate training of officials as to what 
the responsible whistleblowing procedures are. Further development of standards in 
whistleblower protection on the COE level, through the Assembly and the ECtHR, would 
allow the judiciary in contracting parties to challenge overly restrictive domestic laws that 
provide for an excessively narrow list of protected public disclosures. It would also ensure 
that the ECtHR retains its supervisory role in cases where unwarranted retaliatory measures 
were taken against whistleblowers whose disclosures are not damaging to national security 
and contain information that makes a significant contribution to the public interest. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
Technological developments and the advent of the digital age have made it significantly 
easier to leak and share security related information.137 Therefore, the need to find an 
appropriate way to balance national security with the public’s ‘right to know’ is more 
pressing than ever. The paper has attempted to highlight the problems that occur when 
attempting to regulate national security whistleblower exceptions to state secrecy in a manner 
that is compatible with emerging freedom of expression standards of the COE. The COE 
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adheres to the view that whistleblowers are ‘part of society’s alarm and self-repair system, 
bringing attention to problems before they become far more damaging’,138 and it has, in 
recent years, significantly extended free speech protection for unauthorised public interest 
disclosures. The impact this will have on the domestic context remains to be seen, as courts 
and legislators will have to grapple with the task of balancing security interests with the need 
for an informed citizenry. Out of three possible avenues for the PI to be incorporated into 
secrecy laws or whistleblower instruments, the paper has argued that, in relation to national 
security, broad categories of wrongdoing must be included in the law to ensure that 
intelligence officials who proceed to PI disclosures will enjoy free speech protection. This 
will also allow for greater guarantees that the public interest in the information disclosed will 
outweigh the potential harm to national security. The judiciary will be vital in ensuring that 
legislators include a list of protected disclosures that are in line with ECHR demands on 
restrictions to freedom of expression, while the ECtHR, civil society and the broader 
international community can continue to establishing standards for balancing of national 
security with the public accountability of intelligence institutions for their actions. The 
fundamental role of freedom of expression in combating corruption and wrongdoing must 
thus be strengthened and not sacrificed at the altar of national security rhetoric in the 
intelligence community.  
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